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COMMENT
The Legal Effect of Voluntary Pooling and
Unitization: Theories and Party Practice
JOSEPH J. FRENCH, JR.* AND FRANK W. ELLIOTT, JR.
The pooling or combining of smaller tracts is a recognized and expand-
ing practice in the oil and gas industry. Consequently, it is important to
understand the precise legal effect of pooling and unitization. In a typical
situation, if A owns tract 1 and B owns tract 2, and A and B lease their
tracts to X and Y respectively, it is clear that B would not share in the
production from a well located on A's tract. However, if tract 2 is pooled
or unitized with tract 1, B would be permitted to share in the royalties
from a well located on A's tract.
In Parker v. Parker' the owners of contiguous tracts leased them as
though they were a single tract owned by the lessors in common. In
response to special issues the jury found that the parties had orally agreed
that the lease should be considered a unitized one. The court of civil
appeals disregarded the jury's finding and held that, as a matter of law,
the lessors had pooled their interests "so that they will share pro rata in
the royalty no matter from which land oil is produced. '" 2
There are many other forms of pooling,3 as, for example, the true
community lease, which generally describes the area that may be pooled
and gives the other owners of a mineral interest in the described area an
option to join as lessors. When the names of the other owners are subse-
quently inserted in the agreement and the lease has been executed by
them, it has the same effect as a lease executed by one and all at the same
time.4 The entire acreage of the joining lessors is developed and operated
* Member of the Dallas Bar.
'144 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940, error ref'd).
2Ibid. See also French v. George, 159 S.W.2d 566, 569 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942, error
ref'd).
3 Various forms of pooling and types of pooling are discussed in Shank, Some Legal
Problems Presented by the Pooling Provisions of the Modern Oil and Gas Leases, 23
TEXAS L. REv. 150 (1944).
4Se lInes v. Globe Oil & Refining Co., 184 Okla. 79, 84 P.92d 1106 (1938); Thomas
v. Ley, 177 Okla. 150, 57 P.2I 1186 (1936). The lease in the former case provided:
"[A]ny lot, lots or parcels of land embraced within the outer boundary lines of the
above described block or blocks and addition to Oklahoma City may at any time be
included within the terms hereof and become a part of the leased premises covered
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as one lease, and all royalties and rentals are treated as an entirety to be
divided among the separate owners in the proportion that the acreage in
each tract bears to the entire acreage.5
A third form of pooling is created by lessors who, subsequent to the
leasing of their respective tracts, enter into a separate pooling agreement
among themselves and their lessee(s). In Duff v. Du Bose,6 the pooling
agreement signed by the various lessors provided that all of the leases
were "combined, merged, pooled, and shall hereafter be considered one
lease for the purpose and operation of the Texas Company." The courts
have upheld this type of pooling as a valid and binding contract. 7
The most common means of pooling in recent years is that which
results from the lessee's exercise of authority to pool conferred by a pool-
ing clause in the lease, or from an amendment that inserts a pooling
clause in the lease." Typically, these clauses are drafted in broad, all-
inclusive fashion and the lessee is granted the right to pool the lease, or
any portion thereof, with any other land, lease, or mineral estate, to
create a unit of specified size for the purpose of oil and gas development
and production.9 The lease pooling clause has also been upheld by the
courts.10
I. THEORIES OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION
Regardless of the method by which the pooling is achieved, it is be-
lieved that the legal consequences of the pooling should, as far as possible,
be consistent." The owners of the working interests could cooperatively
hereby.... It is further agreed that copies of this lease may be executed at any time
by the owners of any lot or lots .. . [within the described area] and such executed
copies shall have the same force and effect as though such parties and all parties thereto
had executed the same copy of this lease and all such copies shall be deemed to be
originals and to constitute but one lease and that all parties executing such copies as
lessors shall have the same rights and relations as if all had executed the same copy at
the same time." See also Shank, supra note 3, at 153.
5 Thomas v. Ley, 177 Okla. 150,57 P.2d 1186 (1936).
6 14 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929), affld, 27 S.W.2d 122 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1930).
7 Dobbins v. Hodges, 208 La. 143, 23 So. 232 6 (1945); Duff v. Du Bose, 27 S.W.2d
122 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1930).
SHOFFMAN, VOLUNTARY POOLING AND UNITIZATION 87 (1954).
9 For illustrative lease pooling clauses see Grimes v. La Gloria Corp., 251 S.W.2d
755, 756-57 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Miles v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 241 S.W.2d
822, 823-24 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950, error refd n.r.e.); Leopard v. Stanolind Oil & Gas
Co., 220 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949, error ref'd n.r.e.).
10 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson, 218 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954). Cases involving
lease pooling clauses are collected in HoFFAN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 98 n.82.
11 Aside from the rule-against-perpetuities problem, there is no sound reason for at-
taching one set of legal consequences to one form of pooling and another set of con-
sequences to a different form of pooling, although one case has made such a distinction.
The substantive effect in each type of pooling is that the lessee-operator drills and
operates the several tracts as a single lease.
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develop an oil and gas field, but an agreement of this nature will not
permit development without reference to property lines. 12 In order to
ensure complete freedom in the selection of well-sites and to eliminate
the necessity of drilling off-set wells, the royalty owners of the various
tracts must also agree to the cooperative endeavor.13 Therefore, it would
seem that each of the above methods of pooling is directed toward secur-
ing this consent of the royalty owners,14 which, when received, permits
the lessee-operator to drill and operate the several tracts as a single lease.
The legal effect of a community lease was stated by the Texas supreme
court in Veal v. Thomason,5 which is considered to be the origin of the
cross-conveyancing theory:
"The... [community lease] can have no other effect than to constitute
all of the lessors of land in the unitized block joint owners or joint tenants,
of all royalties reserved in each of the several leases in such block, the
ownership being in the proportion which the acreage in each lease con-
tract bears to the total acreage in the unitized block."
In other words, a lessor is permitted to share in the production from a
well on a tract other than his own because the act of pooling constitutes a
cross-conveyance of royalty interests among all the lessors in the unitized
block.' Each lessor conveys a portion of his royalty interest to every
other lessor and simultaneously acquires a royalty interest in every
other tract in the unitized block.'7
12 2 WALKMR, OIL AND GAS 895 (1949).
's See Brown v. Smith, 141 Tex. 425, 431, 174 S.W.2d43,46-47 (1943).
14 See Martel v. A. Veeder Co., 199 La. 423, 433, 6 So. 2d 335, 338 (1942); Brown
v. Smith, supra note 13.
'5 138 Tex. 341,349,159 S.W.2d 472, 476 (1942).
16 See Tanner v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 20 Cal. 2d 814, 820, 129 P.2d 383, 386-87
(1942); Veal v. Thomason, 138 Tex. 341,349, 159 S.W.2d 472,476 (1942).
'
7 Brown v. Smith, 141 Tex. 425, 430-31, 174 S.W.2d 43, 46 (1943) (dictum). The
courts have not decided whether the lessor retains an interest in his own property
equal to his percentage interest in the unit and exchanges the remainder of his interest
for an equal share in every other tract taken singularly, or exchanges all of his royalty
interest for an undivided interest in all of the tracts considered as a unit. The definition
of "property" after unitization or pooling could make a difference on such matters as
venue, property subject to depletion for federal income tax purposes (see BREEDING AqND
BURToN, TAXATION OF OIL AND GAS INCOME 237 (1954)), and ad valorem taxes. See
Texas Attorney General's Opinion No. V-935, October 13, 1949; Hill, State Taxation of
Oil and Gas-Current Developments and Problems, 33 TMxAs L. Rxv. 855, 856-63(955).
A. W. Walker, Jr., states that "a community lease has the effect of creating common
ownership in the royalties payable under the community lease so that each royalty
owner becomes the owner of a royalty interest in each separate tract of land conveyed
by the community agreement .. " Walker, Developments in the Law of Oil and Gas
in Texas During the War Years-A Risumg, 25 TEXAs L. llv. 1, 12 (1946). But see
Tanner v. Title Ins. and Trust Co., 20 Cal. 2d 814, 820, 129 P.2d 383, 386-87 (1942).
However, an exchange of the lessor's entire royalty interest in his own tract for an
undivided interest in the unitized block would seem to be more in accord with the
economic realities of the situation. BREE DI1G AND BURTONT, op. cit. supra. Once the
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The cross-conveyancing theory has thus far been more vociferously
announced in cases involving community leases, although there is no in-
timation of limiting it solely to the community-lease situation.'3 It may
well be that the act of pooling has the effect of creating common owner-
ship in all the minerals under a unitized block so that each owner of a
royalty or working interest becomes the owner of a respective royalty or
working interest in each separate tract of land within the unitized block.
This would mean that each owner of a working interest, like the owner
of a royalty interest, conveys a portion of his interest for an interest in
every other tract in the unitized block equal to the interest retained in
his own tract. The cross-vested interests so created are apparently a form
of determinable interest, the limitation upon their duration being the life
of the agreement which created them.19
The contrary theory, which will be referred to in the rest of this com-
ment as the "allocation theory," has never been completely explained in
any case. The recent decisions have espoused its cause chiefly in opposi-
tion to the cross-conveyancing theory, rather than as a legal device for ex-
plaining the holding in the case. The opinions simply say that the act of
pooling does not effect a cross-transfer of mineral interests;2 0 the pooling
agreement merely grants to the lessee the right to drill and operate his
lessor's tract in conjunction with every other tract in the unitized block. 2 '
The allocation theory is nevertheless commendable for its simplicity.
The basic concept is that the pooling furnishes a different way for each
landowner to realize his fair share of the oil and gas in the common reser-
voir. Oil and gas are fugacious substances and, because of pressure dif-
ferentials, the oil and gas trapped in a reservoir will migrate to the point
where a well is drilled. The allocation theory recognizes this geological
fact and, consequently, production secured on one or more tracts is
deemed production from every tract in the unitized block.22 Each lessor
several tracts are pooled, both lessors and lessees tend to think in terms of the unit and
unit operation rather than in terms of development of the minerals under separate
tracts of land.
Is See Whalen v. Placid Oil Co., 198 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1952); Merrill Engineering
Co. v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 192 Miss. 378, 5 So. 2d 666 (1942); Miles v. Amerada Pe-
troleum Corp., 241 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950, error ref'd n.r.e.); Rogers
Nat'l Bank v. Pewitt, 231 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950, error ref'd).
19 HoxvAN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 146; cf. Brown v. Smith, 141 Tex. 425, 430-31,
174 S.W.2d 43, 46 (1943).
20 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson, 218 F.2d 926, 931 (10th Cir. 1954); Lynch v.
Davis, 79 W. Va. 437, 443-44, 92 S.E. 427, 430 (1917); see Shell Petroleum Corp. v.
Calcasieu Real Estate & Oil Co., 185 La. 751, 771, 170 So. 785, 791 (1936); Boggess v.
Milam, 127 W. Va. 654, 661, 34 S.E.2d 267,270 (1945).
21 Lynch v. Davis, supra note 20. See Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Calcasieu Real Estate
& Oil Co., supra note 20; Boggess v. Milam, supra note 20.
22 Lynch v. Davis, supra note 20; see Merrill Engineering Co. v. Capital Nat'l Bank,
192 Miss. 378, 398, 5 So. 2d 666, 670 (1942). But see Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Cal-
casieu Real Estate & Oil Co., supra note 20.
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and lessee receives his share of production by an allocation formula based
generally on the relation of the number of acres in each tract to the total
acreage in the unitized block.23 Once the production is so allocated, it is
then considered and treated as if it had actually been produced from wells
located on each individual tract.2 4
II. SOME SPECIFIC PROBLEM A.REAS
A. Pooling as a Conveyance of an Interest in Land
In Brown v. Smith,25 involving a suit for specific performance of a
contract to purchase a community oil and gas lease, the vendee asserted
that the abstracts did not show good title as required by the contract. The
ownership of one of the two tracts was subject to an undivided 1/32
royalty interest in a Mrs. Lee who had not joined as lessor in the execu-
tion of the community lease. The opinion of the Texas supreme court
reasoned that the language reserving the royalty interest in the deed
from Mrs. Lee negated an intention to confer upon her grantee the power
or authority to convey or in any way dispose of her royalty interest; that
an oil and gas lease jointly executed by Mrs. Lee's grantee and the own-
ers of the other tract, if effective as to Mrs. Lee's interest, would convey
to each of the other lessors an undivided interest in her royalties. Thus,
Mrs. Lee's grantee, though having full power to lease the land, did not
have the right or authority to pool her royalties with the royalties from
other land.
The court obviously utilized the cross-conveyancing theory to reach
what may prove to be an unsatisfactory result; but the same holding, if
it is a desirable one, could result from the allocation theory. Schlittler v.
Smith2 held that if a grantor does not expressly reserve the right to lease
his retained undivided royalty interest, his grantee has full power to
lease the land. The question in the Brown case was whether the doctrine
of the Schlittler case should be expanded to give the grantee authority to
pool his grantor's royalty interest. The scope of the grantee's power and
authority was the real question decided by the Brown case, 27 and it should
have been decided without reference to whether the pooling does or does
not effect a conveyance of an interest in the land.25
2 3 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson, 218 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954).
24 Lynch v. Davis, 79 W. Va. 437, 443, 92 S.E. 427, 430 (1917); see Phillips Petro-
leum Co. v. Peterson, supra note 23. But cf. Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Calcasieu Real
Estate & Oil Co., 185 La. 751, 770, 170 So. 785, 791 (1936).
25 14l Tex. 425, 174 S.W.2d 4-3 (1943).
26 128 Tex. 628, 101 S.W.2d 543 (1937).
27 See Brown v. Smith, 141 Tex. 425,430, 174 S.W.2d 43,46 (1943).
28See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 137 Tex. 59, 82, 152 S.W.2d 711, 724,
(1941), cited in Brown v. Smith and decided before Veal v. Thomason.
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Although the Texas supreme court found the cross-conveyancing
theory useful in reaching its conclusion in the Brown case, the Texas
commission of appeals experienced considerable difficulty with it in
Knight v. Chicago Corp.29 The plaintiff was the lessor of 320 acres of land.
Paragraph eight of the lease provided:
"In the event lessee, its successors or assigns, should attempt to assign any
undivided interests, overriding royalty or oil payments without the
written consent of the lessors ... or should attempt to assign any tract or
tracts of less than 80 acres, this lease shall ipso facto terminate as to the
interest... owned by the person or corporation making such assignment."
After four producing wells were drilled on the leased premises, the lessee
pooled his working interest with the working interest owned by the
Chicago Corporation for the purpose of developing the natural gas re-
sources and installing a gas recycling program. The plaintiff refused to
join in the pooling agreement and brought suit in trespass to try title for
a decree that the lease had terminated by reason of a breach of paragraph
eight, i.e., an attempt to assign an undivided interest.
The court pointed out that the restrictions on assigning undivided
interests, overriding royalties, and oil payments were against doing those
things which are commonly understood to dilute the working interest and
make it less likely for the lessee to continue to operate the lease. The fail-
ure to name pooling agreements in the lease, while specifically naming
assignments that might impair development and production, signified
that the parties did not intend to forbid this type of "assignment." By this
interpretation, the court avoided the necessity of declaring a termination
of the lease under the theory that the act of pooling cross-conveys the
mineral interests. 30
It is doubtful that the problem in the Knight case would have arisen
under the allocation theory. The restrictions in paragraph eight of the
lease were directed against an assignment of a real property interest.
Under the allocation theory, the act of pooling does not convey an interest
in realty.
The act of pooling is not normally considered by the parties as trans-
ferring title to any land. Thus, in Griswold v. Public Service Co.,31 the
Oklahoma supreme court held that an oral pooling agreement was a valid
and binding contract; but the appellants made no challenge on the ground
of the statute of frauds. The decision is surprising because an earlier case
29 144 Tex. 98, 188 S.W.2d 564 (1945).
30 "The Knight decision represents an excellent illustration of the complications un-
necessarily introduced into the pooling agreement by the cross-conveyance theory. It
may be predicted that others will plague the courts in the future." HoFrm-xN, op. cit.
supra note 8, at 164.
31205 Okla. 412,238 P.2d 322 (1951).
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indicated that Oklahoma would follow the cross-conveyancing theory,32
and the oral pooling agreement under that theory should be unenforceable
by reason of the statute of frauds. 3 This conclusion is supported by the
opinions in Kuklies v. Reinert,34 in which all of the justices assumed that
the rules of conveyancing applied to pooling agreements.3 5
An oral pooling agreement might be valid under the allocation theory
since that theory implies no transfer of title to any land or to any lease
or royalty minerals. Its enforceability would depend upon whether or not
a pooling agreement is an agreement that is not to be performed within
the space of one year.36 But if the oral pooling agreement is valid under
any theory, its use is impractical because of the recordation statutes in
the various jurisdictions. For example, pooling agreements are recorded
in Louisiana, which does not recognize the cross-conveyancing theory,
37
under the civil code provision 38 that "all sales, contracts, and judgments
affecting immovable property, which shall not be so recorded, shall be
utterly null and void, except as between the parties thereto.' 39 Accord-
ingly, a third party who purchases a portion of the unitized block is not
bound by an unrecorded pooling agreement.40
In another situation, where the cross-conveyancing theory could have
32Lusk v. Green, 114 0kla. 113,245 Pac. 636 (1926).
5' The Texas statute of frauds is typical of the statute of frauds in most jurisdictions.
TEX. Civ. STAT. art. 3995 (Vernon 1948) provides: "No action shall be brought in any
court in any of the following cases, unless the promise or agreement upon which such
action shall be brought, or some memorandum thereof, shall be in writing and signed
by the party to be charged therewith or by some person by him thereunto lawfully
authorized: ... 4. Upon any contract for the sale of real estate or the lease thereof for
a longer term than one year; or 5. Upon any agreement which is not to be performed
within the space of one year from the making thereof."
'4 256 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953, error ref'd n.r.e.).
35 The Texas statute of conveyances, Tnx. Cirv. STAT. art. 1288 (Vernon 1948) pro-
vides: "No estate of inheritance or freehold, or for a term of more than one year, in
lands and tenements, shall be conveyed from one to another, unless the conveyance
be declared by an instrument in writing, subscribed and delivered by the party dispos-
ing of the same, or by his agent thereunto authorized by writing."
36 See notes 33 and 35 supra. Under this theory, the pooling or unitization agree-
ment might create a sharing covenant which runs with the land and other, similar in-
terests in real property. See Merrill Engineering Co. v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 192 Miss.
378, 5 So. 2d 666 (1942); HorpAr-, VOLUNTARY POOLING AND UNrrIZATIoN 182
(1954). As to whether a covenant running with the land is within the statute of
frauds, the cases are in conflict. Compare Sprague v. Kimball, 213 Mass. 380, 100 N.E.
622 (1913), with Johnson v. Mount Barker Park Presbyterian Church, 113 Wash. 458,
194 Pac. 536 (1920).
3r Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Calcasieu Real Estate & Oil Co., 185 La. 751, 770-71, 170
So. 785, 791 (1936); see Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Southwest Natural Gas Pro-
duction Co., 221 La. 608, 611-13, 60 So. 2d 9, 10 (1952). But see Coyle v. North Amer-
ican Oil Consol., 201 La. 99, 111-15,9 So. 2d 473,477-79 (1942).
38 LA. CIv. CODnE ANrN. art. 2266 (Dart 1945).
39 United States v. Nebo Oil Co., 190 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1951).
40 Ibid.
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been beneficially applied, it was not. In Sohio Petroleum Co. v. urek,4'
a widow purchased land in her own name with the proceeds from the sale
of personal property belonging to her deceased husband. Under the appli-
cable law, each of the two children and the widow inherited a one-third
interest in the personalty of the intestate. The widow subsequently leased
the land and if was combined with other tracts as a consolidated unit,
apparently under a lease pooling clause. In a suit brought by the two
children in trespass to try title to an undivided two-thirds interest in the
land so purchased, the other royalty owners contended that since the tract
had been pooled with other tracts, each royalty owner was vested with a
proportionate interest in every other tract, and that therefore, as to the
two children, they should be considered innocent purchasers.
The court of civil appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court in
favor of the two children, apparently rendering their interest free from
the unit. The opinion avoided the innocent-purchasers argument by hold-
ing that the other royalty owners did not acquire an interest in the min-
erals by the act of pooling, distinguishing Veal v. Thomason and similar
cases on the ground that joint ownership is created only by a community
lease.42 It is doubtful, however, whether this distinction on the basis of
the form through which the pooling is achieved is a valid one,43 and hence,
Sohio Petroleum Co. v. Jurek should not be taken as conclusive of the
bona-fide-purchaser-for-value question. If the policy considerations be-
hind the bona-fide-purchaser-for-value doctrine are sound, there is no
reason why, in those states that follow the cross-conveyancing theory, the
owners of other tracts in the unitized block should not have the benefit
of this doctrine.
Assuming Sohio Petroleum Co. v. Jurek is correct in holding that the
other royalty owners cannot be protected as innocent purchasers for
value, can they be protected under any other theory, as for example an
estoppel theory? In Kuklies v. Reinert,44 the lessee brought a bill of inter-
pleader against his lessors for the purpose of determining the ownership
of the royalties accruing from a well drilled on the farm belonging to Otto
Reinert. In a cross-action by Otto Reinert against the other lessors in the
unitized area, the trial court adjudged that Otto Reinert was entitled to
all of the royalties in and under his tract, and that the alleged unitization
agreement was void for insufficient description of the tract owned by an-
other defendant. Reversing and rendering, the Texas court of civil appeals
4i 248 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
42 Id. at 298.
43 See Whelan v. Placid Oil Co., 198 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1952); Merrill Engineering
Co. v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 192 Miss. 378, 5 So. 2d 666 (1942); Miles v. Amerada Pe-
troleum Corp., 241 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950, error ref'd n.r.e.); Rogers
Nat'l Bank v. Pewitt, 231 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950, error ref'd).
4 266 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953, error ref'd n.r.e.).
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decided that the description was sufficient, and, alternatively, that Otto
Reinert and his wife were estopped to deny the validity of the pooling
agreement. The majority -view was that since Otto Reinert and his wife
after leasing their tract had executed the pooling agreement and had pro-
ceeded to cooperate with all of the other parties thereto until the time
came to divide the money accumulating from production, their conduct
had estopped them from denying every fact recited in the pooling agree-
ment. Apparently, the court was willing to employ estoppel inter sese on
very slight evidence of affirmative acts in reliance by the other lessors in
the unitized block.
In the Kuklies case, the party estopped was a party to the pooling agree-
ment, but if the person sought to be estopped is not a party to it and is
claiming a unitized tract, it is somewhat more difficult to apply an estoppel
theory for the benefit of neighboring landowners, particularly if the
pooling is effected by an exercise of the lessee's authority under a lease
pooling clause. The doctrine of estoppel in pais requires both a misrepre-
sentation and action or inaction in reliance upon the misrepresentation
to the detriment of the party relying.-5 It is certainly arguable that the
record title constitutes a representation and that the other owners of a
mineral interest, acting in reliance thereon, by pooling have conveyed a
portion of their mineral interest to the apparent owner of the tract in
question, and, therefore, in cross-conveyancing jurisdictions they should
be protected. But whether this argument will prevail in the courts remains
to be determined.
B. The Lease Pooling Clause and the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities
A distinction based on the method by which the pooling is achieved
may be useful in connection with the rule against perpetuities, which is
concerned only with the vesting of remote future estates. 46 It is not vio-
lated where all estates and rights created by the pooling vest immediately
upon execution of the pooling agreement.
In Kenoyer v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.,47 the court sustained a lease
pooling clause against an attack that it violated the rule against perpe-
tuities. The same question was involved in Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Peterson," which also held that the lease pooling clause did not violate
the rule, but in the latter case the lease spelled out the intended effect of
the pooling along the lines of the allocation theory. If pooling pursuant to
a lease pooling clause is not considered to transfer title to any land or
45 19 Am. Jurt., Estoppel § 34 (1939).
46 41 Am. J m., Perpetuities and Restraints on Alienation § 22 (1942).
47 173 Kan. 183, 245. P.2d 176 (1952).
48 18 F.2d 926 (0lth Cir. 1954).
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other real property interest, as under the allocation theory, the rule pre-
sents no difficulty.49 However, in those jurisdictions recognizing the cross-
conveyancing theory the plaintiff's argument in the Kenoyer case, that the
pooling clause creates a "power" in the lessee to convey a portion of his
lessor's mineral estate and that the time within which this "power" can
be exercised is unlimited and indefinite, is not easily answered.
The Phillips case suggests that this "power" of creating remote future
estates is limited to a "reasonable time," and that a "reasonable time" is
well within the limitation of the rule against perpetuities.50 In view of
the beneficial purpose and the economic necessity of the lease pooling
clause, this contention has a great deal of merit, but it is contrary to the
approach taken by the courts in the usual perpetuities situation. Perhaps
a better argument for the validity of the lease pooling clause is that it
does not offend the policy of the rule against perpetuities. 52 The rule was
designed to strike down restrictions that would take land out of trade and
commerce for a period longer than a life in being plus twenty-one years.5 3
Excessive family settlements were the threat that produced the rule, and
the period of perpetuities was tailored to fit the needs of family gift trans-
actions." The real reason for retaining the rule today is that land is a
basic natural resource, and therefore social policy dictates its full utili-
zation. If land is to be fully utilized, the present owner must be encour-
aged to improve the land, and the land must be capable of coming into the
possession of the one who sees its more productive use.5 5 This is best
achieved by a lease pooling clause.
49 See ibid.; Kenoyer v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., supra note 47.
50 218 F.2d at 931. See also Imes v. Globe Oil & Refining Co., 184 Okla. 79, 84 P.2d
1106 (1938); Thomas v. Ley, 177 Okla. 150,152,57 P.2d 1186,1188 (1936).
51 A court will usually examine the language creating the alleged future interest and
determine whether, under a reasonable construction of the language, the interest must
absolutely vest within a life in being plus twenty-one years. See Henderson v. Moore,
144 Tex. 398, 190 S.W.2d 800 (1945); Brooker v. Brooker, 130 Tex. 27, 106 S.W.2d
247 (1937); Neely v. Brogden, 239 S.W. 192 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1922); Coffield v.
Sorrell, 183 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944), afj'd, 144 Tex. 31, 187 S.W.2d 980(1945). If it may vest at a later date, it is held to violate the rule against perpetuities
even though it would in all probability vest before that time. Brooker v. Brooker,
supra; Neeley v. Brogden, supra.
52 An excellent discussion of the policy of the rule against perpetuities appears in
Meyers, The Effect of the Rule Against Perpetuities on Perpetual Non-Participating
Royalty and Kindred Interests, 32 TExAs L. R-v. 369,415-25 (1954).
53 Brooker v. Brooker, 130 Tex. 27, 39, 106 S.W.2d 24-7, 254 (1937); Neely v. Brog-
den, 239 S.W. 192, 193 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1922); 32 TFx. JUR., Perpetuities and Re-
straints on Alienation S 3 (1934).
54 Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective; Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 HAntv. L.
Rav. 721, 737 (1952).
55 Meyers, supra note 52, at 419.
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C. Pooling and the "Thereafter" Clause
As applied to the lease habendum clause--"so long thereafter as oil and
gas is produced"-some of the legal consequences of pooling are signifi-
cant. When the owners have agreed to pool their interests, the commence-
ment of or production from a well on any one of the unitized tracts elimi-
nates the necessity of paying delay rentals-6 and continues each lease
within the unitized block beyond its primary term. 7 In Scott v. Pure Oil
Co.,58 the lessor contended that since only a portion of the leased tract had
been included within a producing unit, the lease had expired as to the
balance of the leased premises. The court held that the lease was still in
effect on all the acreage since "production in paying quantities from the
well or wells on the area unitized may be imputed as the required pro-
duction from each of such component tracts so as to continue such indi-
vidual leases in force as to the entire acreage." To the same effect are
decisions by the supreme courts of Arkansas,59 Louisiana,-0 and Okla-
homa.6 1
On first impression the result seems harsh; conceivably, a one-acre
tract out of a 1,000-acre lease could be included within a unit and the
production on the unit would perpetuate the entire 1,000-acre lease. This
result would appear to be impelled by application of the allocation theory,
which seemingly would offer no defense to the sweeping language of the
amendment to the lease in the Scott case,62 or to the broad language in
which most pooling clauses are drafted. Nonetheless, application of the
allocation theory would not preclude the court from finding a breach of
the implied covenant of further exploration, which would furnish a
ground for cancellation of the lease as to the unexplored portion.6 3
5
r Southland Royalty Co. v. Humble Oil and Refining Co., 151 Tex. 324, 249 S.W.2d
914 (1952).
57McClain v. Harper, 206 Okla. 437, 244 P.2d 301 (1952); Southland Royalty Co.
v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., supra note 56.
58 194 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1952), 31 TExAs L. Rnv. 75 (1952).
59 Gray v. Cameron, 218 Ark. 142,234 S.W.2d 769 (1950).
60 Jackson v. Hunt Oil Co., 208 La. 156, 23 So. 2d 31 (1945). Decisions involving
compulsory pooling reach the same result. Le Blanc v. Danciger Oil & Refining Co.,
218 La. 463, 49 So. 2d 855 (1950); Hunter v. Shell Oil Co., 211 La. 893, 31 So. 2d 10
(1947). But cf. Texas Gulf Producing Co. v. Griffith, 218 Miss. 109, 65 So. 2d 447, on
suggestion of error, 218 Miss. 141, 65 So. 2d 834 (1953).
61 Godfrey v. McArthur, 186 Okla. 144, 96 P.2d 322 (1939); Trawick v. Castleberry,
275 P.2d 292 (Okla. 1953).
62 The amendment authorized the lessee to pool or combine the tract, or any portion
thereof, for purposes of production of gas, and provided that production from the
pooled unit so formed "shall be considered for all purposes (except for the payment of
royalties) as if.. . such production were from land covered by this lease, whether or
not the wells be located on the premises covered by the lease." 194 F.2d 393, 394 (5th
Cir. 1952).
63 A discussion of this matter appears in Meyers, The Implied Covenant of Further
Exploration, 34 TExAs L. Rnv. 533,565-67 (1956).
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Although the courts have not considered theories of pooling and uniti-
zation in this area of the law, it can be argued that a strict adherence to
the cross-conveyancing theory offers a reason for overthrow of the rule
in the Scott case.64 The argument would be that the same exchange which
in theory permits the lessor of an included tract to share in the production
from other tracts is responsible for continuing each lease in force in spite
of the nonpayment of delay rentals and the expiration of the primary
term. Therefore, since the other lessors have no interest in that portion
of a tract not brought within a pooled area and since a lessor is not entitled
to royalties for the unpooled portion of his tract, the lessee is expected to
continue to pay delay rentals on the unpooled portion of the tract, and at
the minimum, the lease will expire at the end of the primary term as to
that portion of the tract not included within a productive unitized area.
This argument, however, in our opinion is unsound. It would be an
automatic provision that would usurp the place of, and tend to accomplish
the same purpose as, the implied covenant of further exploration. Matters
of this nature are better left to the discretion of the courts and made to
depend upon the facts and circumstances in each case. Moreover, the
argument seems to assume that the desires of the lessor and lessee for
production on the non-unitized tract are necessarily at odds with each
other, which in most instances is not the situation at all.
D. The Lessor's Participation in the Royalties After
Surrender of His Tract
Suppose A and B, who own two adjoining tracts of equal size, execute
a single lease covering both tracts. The lease permits the lessee to sur-
render it at any time in whole or in part; however, no provision defines
the rights of the respective lessors upon partial surrender. A producing
well is drilled on A's tract. If the lessee in conformance with the lease
provision surrenders the lease as to B's tract, is B still entitled to share in
the royalties from production on A's tract? If B, after surrender of his
tract, is entitled to share in the production from A's tract, is A entitled to
participate in the royalties from production later secured on B's tract by
virtue of development under another lease or by B himself? These and
many other perplexing problems arise out of this simple fact situation.
Clark v. Elsinore Oil Co.65 considered the first of these questions. The
California court, without discussing theories as to the legal effect of pool.
ing and unitization, decreed that the owner of the surrendered tract con-
tinue to participate on an equal basis in the royalties from production
on the unsurrendered tract, basing the result solely on the presumed
intent of the parties. One writer suggests, however, that the court might
64 31 TExAs L. R1v. 77 (1952).
65 138 Cal. App. 6,31 P.2d 476 (1934).
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just as logically have reached the opposite conclusion, that the lessors did
not intend that the owner of the surrendered tract continue to participate
in the royalties. 6
If B, after surrender of his tract, is entitled to share in the royalties from
production on A's property, it would seem that if B should again lease his
tract and a producing well be drilled thereon, A should participate in the
production on B's tract. However, the decision in Tanner v. Title Ins. and
Trust Co. 6 7 indicates otherwise. As a consequence, under these two cases,
the lessor of the land retained must share the royalties from production
on his tract, but he is denied the corresponding right to share in the royal-
ties from later production on the surrendered tract.
If the allocation theory is applied to the above situation, the lessor of
the surrendered tract should not participate in the production on the
remaining unitized block, nor should the lessor of the retained tract share
in later production on the surrendered tract. The lessor of property par-
ticipates in the royalties from production on the unitized block because
the unit production is regarded as production of oil, gas or other minerals
from his particular tract. Upon surrender of a lessor's tract, or a portion
thereof, the lessee is no longer privileged to produce from the surrendered
property, and it would be an anomaly to consider unit production as pro-
duction from the surrendered tract. The surrendered tract and all rights
to production should be expunged from the unit as of the date of surrender
and a new formula for the computation of royalties applied.
The problem becomes more complex under the cross-conveyancing
theory. If the purpose of the surrender provision is to limit participation
to only the owners of the productive land, the parties must have intended
that the surrender of a tract or tracts eliminates participation in the roy-
alties by the owners of the surrendered premises, and if possible, this
intention certainly ought to be given effect. But how is this intention to
operate? As was stated earlier, the cross-vested interests created by the
cross-conveyancing theory are apparently a form of determinable inter-
est. Is the surrender of a tract, or a portion thereof, by the lessee the
happening of the condition that "determines" the property interests con-
veyed by the act of pooling? If so, doesn't this create a "power" in the
lessee to alter his lessor's mineral estate, which is unlimited in time and
duration and which, therefore, runs afoul of the rule against perpetuities?
The premise of the California courts is that the surrender provision is
inserted solely for the benefit of the lessee and for the express purpose of
relieving him from all further obligations with respect to the land sur-
66 HoFma&N, op. cit. supra note 36, at 67.
6720 Cal. 2d 814, 129 P.2d 383 (1942). See also Tanner v. Olds, 29 Cal. 2d 110, 173
P.2d 6 (1946).
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rendered. 68 They contend that the parties execute a community lease
because of their hope and expectation that oil will be found under some
of the land,69 and because the benefits accruing from the joint adventure
outweigh the benefits that otherwise could be obtained.70 Moreover, this
position is supported by the facts that most of the communitized tracts
are small ones, and that the surrender clauses generally provide for appor-
tionment of the royalties notwithstanding the lessee's surrender of any
part of the leased premises. 71
If this premise of the California courts is correct, the instrument of
surrender should be construed as an assignment of the working interest
by the lessee back to the lessor of the surrendered premises. Although this
construction seems highly artificial in view of the fact that the parties pro-
vided for a "surrender" of all or a part of the leased premises, it finds
some support in that the surrender clause sometimes permits the lessee to
reserve easements for pipelines, roads, tanks, etc., in favor of the retained
tracts. 72 Accordingly, the "surrender" of a tract by the lessee is not the
happening of the condition that "determines" the property interests con-
veyed by the act of pooling, and A and B would still be tenants in common
in the royalties on both the retained and surrendered tracts, with B, the
lessor of the surrendered tract, in addition owning the working interest
in the surrendered premises. Being tenants in common in the royalties,
A and B should be entitled to participate in production from both the
retained and surrendered tracts.
E. Sale by Deed Describing Only the Vendor's Tract
A related problem is the nature and extent of the royalty interest
acquired by a vendee when the deed describes only the vendor's tract and
makes no reference to the pooling agreement. To illustrate, suppose A
and B, who own two adjoining tracts of equal size, execute a single lease
covering both tracts. B subsequently sells his tract to C by a deed that
describes only his tract and makes no reference to the pooling agreement.
What interest, if any, will C have in future production from a well on
A's tract? Can B convey his royalty interest without adequate legal
description, by reference or otherwise, of all the land comprising the
unitized block?
A federal district court in Oklahoma considered the effect of the con-
68 Clark v. Elsinore Oil Co., 138 Cal. App. 6,31 P.2d 476,481 (1934).
6 9 Tanner v. Title Ins. and Trust Co., 20 Cal. 2d 814, 824, 129 P.2d 383, 389 (1942).
70 First Nat'l Bank v. Standard Oil Co., 91 Cal. App. 705, 267 Pac. 548, 549 (1928).
71 See Tanner v. Olds, 29 Cal. 2d 110, 112, 173 P.2d 6, 7 (1946); Tanner v. Title Ins.
and Trust Co., 20 Cal. 2d 814, 818, 129 P.2d 383, 385 (1942); Andrews v. W. K. Co.,
35 Cal. App. 2d 41, 94 P.2d 605, 607 (1939); First Nat'l Bank v. Standard Oil Co., 91
Cal. App. 705, 267 Pac. 548,549 (1928).
72 See Clark v. Elsinore Oil Co., 138 Cal. App. 6,31 P.2d 476,477 (1934).
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veyance of a pooled tract in Boren v. Burgess.7 3 The grantor owned an
undivided mineral interest in two tracts of land, both covered by a single
lease. After production was secured on one of the tracts, the grantor pur-
ported to convey to the plaintiff all of his interest in the other tract. The
plaintiff sued for a share of the royalties in the producing tract. The court
stated, after pointing out a conflict of authorities on the question, that
"the majority and Oklahoma rule is to the effect that all the production
belongs solely to the owners of the well and the land on which the well
is located." The authorities cited by the court, however, only support the
Japhet v. McRae74 principle that when land covered by an ordinary lease
is later subdivided in ownership, there is no apportionment of the royal-
ties; i.e., the owner of each subdivision receives the entire royalty from
production on his subdivision.75
A decision deriving a contrary rule is Merrill Engineering Co. v. Capital
Nat'l Bank,7 6 in which the conveyance of a tract comprising part of a
unit, even though it failed to mention the unit, passed the grantor's inter-
est in all royalties in the unitized block. The opinion noted the rule of
non-apportionment of royalties, applied when the owner of a tract of
land leases it as a whole and thereafter subdivides it into several tracts by
conveyances that do not reserve the royalty; but, in contrast to the Boren
case, the Mississippi court decided the rule had application "where the
respective landowners supplant the effect of the original lease by entering
into a pooling or community agreement with the consent of the lessee,
whereby all of the several tracts may be developed as a unit with the
right of the several owners to share in the royalties derived from any well
or wells drilled anywhere on the pooled area." The court indicated that
the grantor's share in the royalties passed with the conveyance of title as
a covenant running with the land.
The allocation theory appears to sustain the conclusion of this latter
case. The landowner is entitled to participate in the royalties because the
oil and gas produced on the unit is deemed production on his particular
tract. Since the pooling does not effect a cross-conveyance of the mineral
interests, a conveyance by the owner of property without reservation of a
royalty or mineral interest should convey all of the grantor's rights and
interests in the described property. The grantee should succeed to the
same royalties to which the grantor was previously entitled.
Application of the cross-conveyancing theory might not give the same
result. The previously mentioned case of Tanner v. Title Ins. and Trust
Co.77 states that "the royalty interest thus transferred by each landowner
73 971F. Supp. 1019 (E.D. Okla. 1951).
74 276 S.W. 669 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925).
75 HO FMAN, VOLT.TARY POOLING AND UNITIZATION 176 (1954).
761 92 Miss. 378,5 So. 2d 666 (1942).
7720 Cal. 2d 814,820, 129 P.2d 383, 386-87 (1942).
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to his colessors is an incorporeal hereditament in gross . . . and the
grantee's interest in the oil produced upon the property of one of the
colessors is entirely separate and distinct from the royalty interest re-
tained by him in oil which might be produced from his own premises...
[T] he incorporeal hereditament owned by the grantor in the oil produced
from land of his colessors, existing in gross, obviously does not follow the
conveyance of the lessor's land, but can only be conveyed by a specific
transfer of that interest." Several more recent California cases have con-
firmed and applied this language of the Tanner case.7 8 However, there is
no special reason, except in California, to consider the interest of a lessor
in the land of his colessors as a right or interest in gross, and one writer
suggests that such an interest in the land of the colessors is better treated
as a right or interest appurtenant rather than in gross.79
III. NECESSARY PARTIES TO A SUIT IN TEXAS INVOLVING
POOLED OR UNITIZED LAND
No discussion of theories as to the legal effect of pooling or unitization
would be complete without mention of the question of necessary parties
to a suit involving a pooled or unitized tract. Rule 39 of the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure80 sets forth the basic principles pertaining to necessary
' 78Howard v. General Petroleum Corp., 108 Cal. App. 2d 25, 238 P.2d 145, 148
(1951), on second appeal, 114 Cal. App. 23 91, 249 P.2d 585 (1952); Brown v. Copp,
105 Cal. App. 2d 1, 232 P.2d 868, 871 (1951); Friedrich v. Roland, 95 Cal. App. 2d3543,
213 P.2d 423, 427 (1950); Gillis v. Royalty Serv. Corp., 91 Cal. App. 2d 365, 204 P.2d
968 (1949).79 HopFarA, op. cit. supra note 75, at 184.
8 0 Tnx. R. Civ. P. 39. "Necessary Joinder of Parties.
"(a) Necessary joinder. Except as otherwise provided in these rules, persons having
a joint interest shall be made parties and joined as plaintiffs or defendants. When a
person who should join as a plaintiff refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or,
in proper cases, an involuntary plaintiff.
"(b) Effect of failure to join. When persons who ought to be parties if complete re-
lief is to be accorded between those already parties, have not been made parties and
are subject to the jurisdiction of the court, the court shall order them made parties. The
court in its discretion may proceed in the action without making such persons parties,
if its jurisdiction over them can be acquired only by their consent or voluntary ap-
pearance; but the judgment rendered therein shall not affect the rights or liabilities of
persons who are not parties.'
"(c) Names of omitted persons and reasons for non-joinder to be pleaded. In any
pleading in which relief is asked, the pleader shall set forth the names, if known to him,
of persons who ought to be parties, if complete relief is to be accorded between those al-
ready parties, but who are not joined, and shall state why they are omitted."
Several theories have been advanced on the proper interpretation of this rule. Per-
haps the best of these is that set out in Stayton, Important Developments Since 1940
in the Texas Law Relating to Parties and Actions, in LE-ruaEs op REFrEsHE CoursE
IN LAw 2 (University of Texas School of Law ed. 1946). Judge Stayton says that rule
39 embraces two kinds of necessary parties. The first is composed of parties having a
"joint interest" so strong that a valid judgment cannot be rendered without them. They
are necessary in the sense that they must be joined-indispensable in the strictest
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parties. And no matter which theory as to the legal effect of pooling or
unitization is selected, the fundamental application of these principles
remains the same. However, since the Texas cases on the problem have
adopted, almost to the exclusion of all others, the cross-conveyance theory,
attention will be directed to it. Because this theory results in a cotenancy
of the various lessors in each unitized tract, a look at non-pooling coten-
ancy cases involving the party question is in order.
A. Parties in Cotenancy Cases
Before the adoption of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure in 1941, in a
dispute between tenants in common and a stranger to their title, one cote-
nant could recover possession of the entire tract, and title to the portion
owned by him, in trespass to try title without the joinder of his cotenants.81
If damages to the land were sought, the absent cotenants had to be made
parties, 2 but only if the defendant insisted upon it.83 If the defendant did
not so insist, the trial could be had, damages being apportioned to the
named plaintiffs84 If the plaintiffs and defendants were all tenants in
common, the actual plaintiffs could not recover the possession of the entire
tract but could recover their aliquot share of the title if joinder was not
demanded8 5
After the adoption of the rules, two cases have discussed the application
of rule 39 to trespass-to-try-title suits. In Hicks v. Southwestem Settle-
ment and Development Corp.5 several of the tenants in common sued
strangers to their title for title and possession, joining a claim for damages,
and the defendants entered a plea in abatement for non-joinder. The court
decided that the plaintiffs could recover possession and their portion of the
title without joinder of the absent cotenants because the defendants were
strangers to their title, 7 but that all of the cotenants must be joined in
order to recover damages. This decision followed strictly the pre-rule
cases. However, there were so many tenants in common (over 600) and
it was so inconvenient to join them that an exception was read into the
sense. The second class is made up of those having a "joint interest" who are necessary
if complete relief is to be accorded to the other parties to the suit. They are parties who
should be joined, and, if another party insists upon it, must be joined unless they are
outside the jurisdiction of the court. Even though these parties are omitted recovery
is allowed if their presence is not insisted upon. Judge Stayton calls these "insistible
parties."
82Padgett v. Guilmartin, 106 Tex. 551, 172 S.W. 1101 (1915); Bounds v. Little, 75
Tex. 316, 12 S.W. 1109 (1889); Cook v. Spivey, 174 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. Civ. App. 194,3).
82 May v. Slade, 24 Tex. 205 (1859); Arrington v. Southern Pine Lumber Co., 16
S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).8 3 Gulf, C. & S.F. By. v. Cusenberry, 86 Tex. 525,26 S.W. 43 (1894).
84 Mayv. Slade, 24 Tex. 205 (1859).
85 Boon v. Knox, 80 Tex. 642, 16 S.W. 448 (1891).
86 188 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945, error ref'd want of merit).
87 The absent cotenants would not be bound by the decision.
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rule, and joinder was not required. Brown v. Meyers-8 used different
reasoning to reach a partially conflicting result. The court held that
joinder of all tenants in common was needed both to recover the land and
to recover the damages. The decision was based on the wording of the
rule, not on prior case law. The absent parties were deemed not indis-
pensable, and if their presence were not demanded, the present plaintiffs
could wage the fight. In both cases error was refused for want of merit,
the supreme court thus approving only the judgments and not the reason-
ing, and consequently the law is still in a confusing state.
Before 1941, if the omitted parties were tenants in common with the
defendants, the suit could be tried without joinder, whether there was a
plea in abatement or not, the result binding only those named sO Since the
adoption of the rules, such parties would have to be joined if demanded,
but would not be absolutely indispensable.
B. Title Suits in Which One Party's Interest is Unitized
Suits involving the party problem in pooling situations can be anal-
ogized to those cotenancy suits between cotenants and a stranger to their
title. The landmark pooling case is Veal v. ThomasonY' The plaintiff in
that case sued to set aside a trustee's sale of certain land to the defendant
and free the land from a community oil and gas lease including other
lands totaling about 6,000 acres. The named defendants, who were the
purchasers at the trustee's sale and the lessee under the community lease,
claimed that all of the royalty owners in the unitized block were necessary
parties since they were cotenants of the royalty interest in the subject
land. The supreme court accepted the court of civil appeal's definition of
necessary parties, saying, "it has many times been held by the courts of
this state that those who are necessary parties to a suit are such persons
as have or claim a direct interest in the object and subject matter of the
suit and whose interests will necessarily be affected by any judgment that
may be rendered therein. Such persons are not only proper parties but
are necessary and indispensable parties, plaintiff or defendant."' 91 This
led to the result that all royalty owners in the block were necessary
parties; otherwise they "will have had . .. [their] royalty interest in
this land, for all practical purposes, cut off and destroyed without having
had their day in court." 92
Although Thomason's petition contained a trespass-to-try-title count,
the nature of the proceeding was primarily an equitable one, seeking to
have the trustee's sale and lease set aside. Doubt arose as to whether the
88 163 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942, error ref'd want of merit).
89 Heirs of Tevis v. Armstrong, 71 Tex. 59,9 S.W. 134 (1888).
90 138 Tex. 341,159 S.W.2d 472 (1942).
91 Id. at 351, 159 S.W.2d at 477.
92 Ibid.
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rules set out in the case were also applicable to a trespass-to-try-title
action involving no equitable principles such as those that pertain to
cancellation of an instrument. Shortly thereafter, in Belt v. Texas Co.,93
a trespass-to-try-title action to recover six tracts in the same block as that
in Veal v. Thomason, the plaintiff made this very contention. The district
court held that the royalty owners were necessary parties and the court
of civil appeals affirmed its judgment, expressly extending the doctrine
of the Veal case.94
In Whelan v. Placid Oil Co. 5 the plaintiff was the lessee of the land in
question and a short time before the expiration of the primary term of the
lease joined with the owner of half the minerals in a unitization agree-
ment. The owner of the other half of the minerals did not concur in the
agreement. The plaintiff completed a well on the unit, though not on the
land in question, during the primary term of the lease. After the expira-
tion of the primary term, the owners of both halves of the minerals joined
in the execution of a lease to the defendants. The controversy concerned
the lease of the owner of the half interest that had been included in the
unit. The court held that the plaintiff could claim a leasehold in this half
only by virtue of the unitization agreement. This being the case, Veal v.
Thomason required that all other mineral owners in the unit join in the
action. The holding of the Veal case was stretched a little by being made
the primary authority for this decision, because that case and the Belt
case involved parties defendant whereas Whelan concerned parties
plaintiff. However, the decision could be based on the principles set out
in the cotenancy cases discussed above. Since damages were sought in
Whelan, it seems that the decision to require joinder was correct.
C. Partition Suits
When partition is sought, the rule of Veal v. Thomason does not apply.
In Douglas v. Butcher,96 the plaintiffs, owners of an undivided half of the
minerals in a tract, sued the owners of the other half for partition. The
defendants' interest was included in a pool, while the plaintiffs' was not.
The trial court dismissed the suit for the plaintiffs' refusal to join the
some 2,300 royalty owners of the pool. The San Antonio court of civil
appeals reversed the judgment and allowed the suit to proceed without
joinder, stating that in a partition suit royalty owners are not necessary
93 175 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943, error refd). See also Leach v. Brown, 251
S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952, error ref'd).
94 It is interesting to note that rule 39 is not mentioned in either the Veal or the
Belt case. Under our discussion in note 80 supra, the absent parties in both cases would
be classified as insistible, since a valid judgment could have been rendered without
them. Since joinder was requested, they would be treated as if they were indispensable,
and the differentiation would be academic.
95 198 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1952).
96 272 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954, error ref'd n.r.e.).
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parties. Each royalty owner received royalty in proportion to acreage,
and the undivided one-half belonging to the plaintiffs never constituted
any part of the ratio. The interest of the non-joined royalty owners would
be neither increased nor diminished by a partition, and hence they were
not necessary parties under the doctrine of the Veal case. The court
actually based its decision on the rule of property that the owner of a
non-possessory interest can neither compel nor defeat a partition, and
since royalty interests are non-possessory, the owners of such interests
are not necessary parties, whether their interests are affected or not. The
question remains concerning the effect of such a partition on the royalty
interests. If the non-joined owners are permitted to retain their interests
in an undivided half, they would be unaffected; but the partition itself
would be at least a partial failure. If their interests are partitioned, they
would be affected-losing an undivided half of the whole and gaining a
complete interest in a divided half. A case cited by the court in support of
its decision points to the latter result,97 saying, after allowing the par-
tition because of the rule of property discussed above, that "it... would
not be consistent to hold that ... partition could not reach and bind any
royalty interest incident to the lease.""" However, this quotation is dictum,
since the royalty owner was a party to the suit. No other cases have been
found to support this result.
D. Suits in Which the Pool or Unit Is Not Sought to Be
Affected
A non-pooling case suggests that when the question involved is the
validity of mineral leases on a unitized tract and neither lessee is trying
to cancel the unit agreement, the lessees may litigate the contested lease-
hold without having to join their lessor or other royalty owners in the
unit.99
97 Chaffin v. Hall, 210 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948, error ref'd n.r.e.).98 Id. at 193.
99 Petroleum Producers Co. v. Reed, 135 Tex. 386, 144 S.W.2d 540 (1940). This case
was a trespass-to-try-title suit to recover an oil and gas leasehold estate. The defendants
claimed that the State of Texas should be a party, since the property in dispute was
vacant school land belonging to the state and they held an oil and gas lease executed
by the Commissioner of the General Land Office. The court decided that the title to the
leasehold could be litigated without the state as a party, since its interest was not direct-
ly involved (its ownership of the land was not in issue). This case was distinguished in
Belt v. Texas Co., the court saying that the controversy involved the mineral estate
and not the entire estate in the land.
It was suggested in Dedman, Indispensable Parties in Pooling Cases, 9 Sw. L.J. 27
(1955), that Whelan v. Placid Oil Co. (see text at note call 95) is in conflict with the
Reed case, supra. Mr. Dedman argues that no matter what result on the merits the
Whelan case might have reached, the absent parties would still be claiming their uniti-
zation agreement, and no attempt was being made to cancel or set aside this agree-
ment. However, in Masterson, Indispensable Parties in Oil and Gas Litigation, in
SIXTn ANrUAL INSTITUTE ON Om AND GAS LAWv ArD TAxATxoNr 139, 158 (Southwest-
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In addition, the Fifth Circuit, in deciding a Mississippi case,100 re-
affirmed the principle of Veal, but allowed suit for title to land in a unit
without joinder of the unit's royalty owners because the plaintiffs adopted
and ratified the unitization agreement and sought only to substitute them-
selves for their adversaries in the unit without affecting in any manner
the rights of the other parties thereto. This ruling was later adopted in
Texas.' 01 The issues were reduced to a determination of which of the two
parties had the proper claim to the interest in question. Correspondingly,
the royalty owners in the unit were not necessary parties to the pro-
ceedings. The only weakness of this procedure is that the successful
plaintiff must ratify the unit to be able to sue without joinder.
E. Possibilities of Suit By or Against a Pool or Unit Without
Joinder of Royalty Owners
The distinction must be made at this time between suits involving
members of a pool or unit and a stranger and those involving strictly
members of the pool or unit itself. The joinder requirements of the former
are not so great, and the suggestions offered below would be applicable to
them. The latter category would cover the cases of a single instrument,
signed by all the parties (community lease) or their agent (lease with
authority to pool). Here the joinder requirements will be strict, since in
a suit to cancel written instruments all persons whose rights, interests, or
relations with or through the subject matter of the suit will be affected by
the cancellation are indispensable parties. 0 2 Not all of the following
suggestions will apply to this category. Those that do will be noted.
When there are so many tenants in common that it is impractical to
join them the "equitable exception" offered by the Hicks case-3 may be
applied. However, the inherent danger in relying on this departure from
the joinder rules is the risk that the trial judge's application of the excep-
tion will not be affirmed on appeal. The question might have to be carried
all the way to the supreme court at great delay and expense before the
plaintiff would know whether or not he had complied with all the require-
ments necessary for a proper trial of his substantive rights. On the other
hand, if the trial court refuses to apply the exception, the appellate pro-
cedure would have to be resorted to in order to get the substantive claims
ern Legal Foundation ed. 1955), it was stated that while the court in the Whelan case
would have been justified in following the Reed case, there was no conflict. The author
explains his position by stating, "this is because the matter of bringing in absent per-
sons is a matter of policy and has nothing to do with jurisdiction to act upon parties
before the court insofar as their rights are involved."
o
0 0 Hudson v. Newell, 174 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1949).
20 1 Fussell v. Rinque, 269 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954, error refd n.r.e.);
Hutchins v. Birdsong, 268 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953, error ref'd).
'10 2 Sharpe v. Landowners Oil Ass'n, 127 Tex. 147, 92 S.W.2d 435, 436 (1936).
103 See note 86 supra.
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before a court at all. In addition, the rules allowing service by publication
on non-resident defendants,10 unknown heirs, 105 and unknown owners or
claimants of an interest in land'0 6 would remove these categories of per-
sons from the total number to be considered in deciding upon the equity of
the situation. Since jurisdiction of them can be obtained without personal
service, they should not be counted among those causing the difficulty.
Two suggestions have been made for the unit itself to follow. The first
is that the unit could voluntarily be made into a corporation. 0 7 However,
the double-taxation aspect would probably reduce this to a mere theo-
retical possibility. The second is that the members of the unit could desig-
nate in the unit agreement an agent to receive service of process or to sue
in behalf of the unit.0 8 Both of these suggestions are based on the assump-
tion that the members of the unit want to facilitate suits against them-
selves. This very idealistic view likely will not stand up in practice.
One writer recommends that an act of the legislature constituting the
Secretary of State or other state official the agent for service of all whose
addresses are known be passed as a solution. 0 9 The lessees would furnish
such addresses, the time for answering would be extended, and proper
funds and facilities would be provided for carrying out the operations
involved.
The three preceding solutions would apply to the intra-unit situation.
Another suggestion is an amendment of subdivision (a) of rule 39 to add:
"or, unless the court rules otherwise, need not be made a party to the
suit."bo However, this amendment would apply also to suits in which
truly indispensable parties are involved, and the trial judge should not
have discretion to avoid the joinder of these parties. In addition, it would
not cover the possibility of multiple defendants. Perhaps this difficulty
could be eliminated by placing the following (italicized) amendment in
subdivision (b) of the rule, causing it to read:
"(b) EFFECT OF FAILURE TO JOIN. When persons who ought to be
parties if complete relief is to be accorded between those already parties,
have not been made parties and are subject to the jurisdiction of the court,
the court shall order them made parties, unless such possible parties plain-
tiff or defendant are too numerous for practical inclusion as named parties.
The court in its discretion may proceed in the action without making such
104 Tnx. R. Civ. P. 108, 109.
0Th.x.. Civ. P. 111.
'
0 6 T-x. R. Crv. P. 112, 113.
10 Dedman, supra note 99.
208 Dedman, supra note 99; Cook-, Rights and Remedies of the Lessor and Royalty
Owner Under a Unit Operation, in INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAs LAw AND TAxATIoN 101
(Southwestern Legal Foundation ed. 1952).
209 Cook, supra note 108.
110 Masterson, supra note 99.
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persons parties... 111 but the judgment rendered therein shall not affect
the rights or liabilities of persons who are not parties."
The judgment in a suit following this procedure would not bind the absent
parties, but the suit could at least be prosecuted. Substantial effectiveness
would be achieved if the operator and the larger royalty owners were
joined, since the greater part of the land could be recovered.
A final recommendation is a statute or rule that permits constructive
service on every party to the unit agreement by actually serving the
operator of the unit together with the individual owners of the particular
tract of land involved. 1. 2 These persons are chosen as the agents to receive
service because they are the ones who would have the greatest interest
in the suit and would ensure that the unit is adequately represented. The
operator should have the addresses of all parties in the unit and could
notify them of the suit without too much trouble, at least much less than
would be required if personal service were made on each party. This
suggestion could be varied by a practice derived from the Texas Trust
Act.11 3 Service on the operator and notice by registered mail to the royalty
owners would suffice under the practice there suggested. A list of the
owners would be furnished by the operator on demand.
F. Class Action
The most logical and equitable solution to the problem is found in the
class action. Rule 4214 provides the procedure necessary for this type of
suit. An action involving a pooling or unitization agreement should fall
within the provisions of subdivision (a) (2) of that rule. The rights are
Ill Omitted portion: "if its jurisdiction over them can be acquired only by their con-
sent or voluntary appearance."
112 Dedman, supra note 99.
":3 TEx. Civ. STAT. art. 7425b- 21 C (Vernon 1948).
114 Tax. R. Crv. P. 42. "Class Actions.
"(a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it
impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as will
fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued,
when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is
"(1) joint, or common or secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary right
refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes entitled to
enforce it;
"(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which do or
may affect specific property involved in the action; or
"(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several
rights and a common relief is sought.
"(b) Dismissal or compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed nor compromised
without the approval of the court. If the right sought to be enforced is one defined in
paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of this rule notice of the proposed dismissal or com-
promise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.
If the right is one defined in paragraphs (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) notice shall be
given only if the court requires it."
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several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which
may affect the specific property involved. 1 5
In Hicks v. Southwestern Settlement and Development Corp. the court
overruled the plaintiffs' contention that rule 42 authorized them to main-
tain the suit without joinder of other parties. There was an extensive dis-
cussion of the class-action problem, but since this type of relief was
requested for the first time on appeal, the terms of the rule itself demon-
strated that the contention was untenable. The plaintiffs did not plead
that they were suing as representatives of a class nor did they prove that
they adequately represented the class. The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas twice had the question before it.16 In an
action to recover title and possession of certain land and for damages of
$500,000,000, the plaintiffs made class allegations under rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,"11 seeking to represent a large number
of their cotenants. The court held that the substantive law of Texas
required joinder and that rule 23 had no effect on that law."" In the
second hearing the court stated that when several tenants in common sue
other tenants in common in trespass to try title, those named as plaintiffs
may recover only their aliquot part of the title, and may not recover for
the non-joined cotenants. 119 The opinion went on to say that the rights
of the various plaintiffs were several, not joint, and therefore a class action
was not appropriate in Texas. 20 Much reliance was placed on the dicta in
Hicks in reaching this decision.
Matthews v. Landowners Oil Ass'n2 :1 takes a step in the opposite direc-
tion. Thirteen named plaintiffs sought to represent all landowners simi-
larly situated in a suit to cancel certain mineral conveyances and leases
of lands that were included in a pooling agreement. There were twenty-
four named defendants, alleged to be fairly representative of all the
defendants. The named defendants maintained that necessary parties had
been omitted, and their contention was sustained. The Amarillo court of
civil appeals affirmed, but recognized the right to a class action under
":5 A recent case, Davis v. Congregation Shearith Israel, 283 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1955, error ref'd n.r.e.), involved a class action to adjudicate rights in a tract of
land. The plaintiffs sued class representatives for a declaratory judgment declaring
that their tract of land was not burdened with certain deed restrictions. The class action
was allowed.
116 Glover v. McFaddin, 81 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Tex. 1948); Glover v. McFaddin, 99
F. Supp. 385 (E.D. Tex. 1951), aff'd, 205 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 34.6 U.S.
900 (1953).
11 Rule 42 of the Texas rules is taken verbatim from rule 23 (a) and (c) of the federal
rules.
31s Glover v. McFaddin, 81 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Tex. 1948).
"19 Glover v. McFaddin, 99 F. Supp. 385 (E.D. Tex. 1951), afl'd, 205 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 900 (1953).120 But see Tnx. R. Civ. P. 42(a) (3), supra note 114.
121 204 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947, error refd n.r.e.).
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proper circumstances. The court cited and discussed the Veal and Belt
cases, and stated that the rules therein would apply unless the requisites
for a class action were strictly complied with. The court added ".. . and
this fact must appear from the plaintiffs' allegations... [and] proof.7122
The class action was denied only because the plaintiffs failed to establish
their qualifications as representatives (there was a conflict of interests
within the class), and failed to show the practical need for representation.
In a pooling case recently decided by the San Antonio court of civil
appeals'1 2 an attempt has been made to plead a class action properly. The
pleadings state that the plaintiff does not know the exact number of
defendants but that there are more than 300; they identify the class
specifically and negate the possibility of conflicting interests; they state
that the members of the class are so numerous and scattered that it would
be impracticable and prohibitively expensive to locate and serve them all;
that even if that were done, there would be numerous interruptions of
the proceedings by reason of death and other changes in status; that the
named defendants are members of the class; and that they have a suffi-
ciently substantial interest in the matters in controversy to ensure ade-
quate representation. This pleading seems to comply with the require-
ments of rule 42, and though disallowed by the trial court, it was ap-
proved by the court of civil appeals, the opinion of which stated that this
was the type of situation for which the class action was designed. The
appellate decision should be affirmed by the supreme court if a class ac-
tion is at all possible in Texas.
Each of the three cases just discussed, in which a class action was
attempted, involved a dispute between tenants in common as both plain-
tiffs and defendants. Even though in such a situation the parties may be
considered indispensable, the class action should be allowed. If the repre-
sentation requirements are met-a necessity for the application of the
rule-all of the parties' substantive rights will be protected and justice
should be done.
IV. CONCLUSION
Theories as to the legal effect of pooling and unitization have not be-
come so entrenched in our oil and gas law that the decisions expounding
these theories cannot be explained on other grounds. The Texas courts12 4
122 Id. at 651.
123Leach v. Brown, 251 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952, error ref'd), on second
appeal, 287 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956), rev'd, 292 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Sup. Ct.
1956), now pending again in the supreme court on application for writ of error, after
the third opinion by the court of civil appeals, 298 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
124 Brown v. Smith, 141 Tex. 425, 430, 174 S.W.2d 43, 46 (1943); Veal v. Thomason,
138 Tex. 341, 349, 159 S.W.2d 472, 476 (1942); Leach v. Brown, 251 S.W.2d 553, 554
(Tex. Civ. App. 1952, error ref'd); Miles v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 241 S.W.2d 822,
825 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950, error refd n.r.e.); Matthews v. Landowners Oil Ass'n, 204
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and the California courts 25 have paid considerable homage to the cross-
conveyancing theory. The Oklahoma supreme court in dictum has also
recognized it. 1 26 But opposed to that theory are the courts of Kansas,1 2 7
Louisiana, 128 Mississippi, 29 and Pennsylvania, 130 which do not appear to
be committed to any particular theory. On the other hand, decisions in
West Virginia,13 and the Tenth Circuit 8 2 have explicitly recognized the
allocation theory.
No decision has recognized either the cross-conveyancing theory or the
allocation theory as an absolute rule of property.3 3 Parties who have
clearly expressed an intention that one theory or the other should control
can reasonably expect that their intent will be given effect. 3 4 Only if they
have not clearly expressed themselves will each jurisdiction apply its own
particular theory. We find it difficult to conceive why, absent special
circumstances, any owner of a mineral interest would deliberately desire
the problems and consequences of the cross-conveyancing theory.
S.W.2d 647, 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947, error refd n.r.e.); Belt v. Texas Co., 175 S.W.2d
622, 624 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943, error ref'd).
1 25 Tanner v. Olds, 29 Cal. 2d 110, 116, 173 P.2d 6, 9 (1946); Tanner v. Title Ins. &
Trust Co., 20 Cal. 2d 814, 129 P.2d 383, 386 (1942).
12r See Lusk v. Green, 114 Okla. 113, 114, 246 Pac. 636, 637 (1926). But cf. Griswold
v. Public Serv. Co., 205 Okla. 412, 238 P.2d 322 (1951) (oral pooling agreement binding
on the lessor).
127 See Kenoyer v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 173 Kan. 183, 186-87, 245 P.2d 176, 179
(1952).
128 Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Calcasieu Real Estate & Oil Co., 185 La. 751, 770-71, 170
So. 785, 791 (1936); see Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Southwest Natural Gas Produc-
tion Co., 221 La. 608, 611-13, 60 So. 2d 9, 10 (1952). But see Coyle v. North American
Oil Consol., 201 La. 99, 111-15, 9 So. 2d473, 477-79 (1942).
129 See Merrill Engineering Co. v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 192 Miss. 378, 398, 400, 5 So.
2d 666, 672 (1942); Ho- rMAN, op. cit. supra note 75, at 180. In the Merrill case no
argument was made that pooling effects a conveyance of an interest in land, but the
language of the decision, particularly with reference to drainage, would seem in accord
with the allocation theory.
130 Coolbaugh v. Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Co., 218 Pa. 320, 67 Atl. 616 (1907)
(joint coal lease).
13' Lynch v. Davis, 79 W. Va. 437, 92 S.E. 427 (1917); see Boggess v. Milam, 127
W. Va. 654, 661, 34 S.E.2d 267, 270 (1946). But see Pittsburg & W. Va. Gas Co. v.
Ankrom, 83 W. Va. 81, 88, 97 S.E. 693, 596 (1918), decided by the same court the
following year and citing Lynch v. Davis for the proposition that lessors who had
pooled their tracts in a community lease had thereby made themselves "tenants in
common" in the minerals.
'
32 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson, 218 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954).
'
33 But see Parker v. Parker, 144 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940, error refd). Cf.
French v. George, 159 S.W.2d 566, 569 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942, error refd).
134 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson, 218 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954); French v.
George, 159 S.W.2d 666, 569 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942, error ref'd).
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